LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin recently presented a strong security definition for authenticated key agreement strengthening the well-known Canetti-Krawczyk definition. They also described a protocol, called NAXOS, that enjoys a simple security proof in the new model. Compared to MQV and HMQV, NAXOS is less efficient and cannot be readily modified to obtain a one-pass protocol. On the other hand MQV does not have a security proof, and the HMQV security proof is extremely complicated. This paper proposes a new authenticated key agreement protocol, called CMQV ('Combined' MQV), which incorporates design principles from MQV, HMQV and NAXOS. The new protocol achieves the efficiency of HMQV and admits a natural one-pass variant. Moreover, we present a relatively simple and intuitive proof that CMQV is secure in the LaMacchia-Lauter-Mityagin model.
Introduction
Researchers from IBM and Microsoft have recently proposed two-pass Diffie-Hellman authenticated key agreement protocols called HMQV [9] , KEA+ [13] and NAXOS [12] . In these protocols the two communicating parties exchange static (long-term) and ephemeral (short-term) public keys, and thereafter combine them to obtain a session key. The papers [9, 13, 12] highlight certain security issues with previous related key agreement protocols and propose solutions to address those issues. The goal of this paper is to devise a new protocol that has the best of all worlds incorporated in its design.
Security models and definitions. Choo, Boyd and Hitchcock [7] compared the most commonly used security models for key agreement [4, 3, 6] . Their conclusion was that none of the models as defined provides a significant advantage over the rest of the models. Furthermore, these models fail to capture some desirable properties of key agreement. Most significantly, the adversary is not allowed to obtain certain secret information about the session that is being attacked. Krawczyk [9] addressed many of these concerns by providing a stronger version of the Canetti-Krawczyk model [6] that captures additional security properties. These desirable properties include resistance to key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS), and resilience to the leakage of ephemeral private keys (LEP). More recently LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin [12] provided a single definition that simultaneously captures all these security properties. Their security model will henceforth be called the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. Protocols. NAXOS is proven secure in the eCK model, but is less efficient in that it requires 4 exponentiations per party compared to 2.5 exponentiations for MQV and HMQV. In addition there is no natural modification of NAXOS to a one-pass protocol. Unlike MQV [14] , the HMQV [9] protocol has a formal security proof 1 . However the proof is extremely long and complicated, and some significant (but fixable) flaws [16, 17] have been discovered. The security proof for KEA+ [13] is in a model that is weaker than eCK; for example the adversary is not allowed to obtain the static private keys of both communicating parties. Table 1 compares MQV, HMQV, KEA+ and NAXOS in terms of efficiency (number of exponentiations per party), security and underlying assumptions. (See Section 3.3 for a more detailed analysis of the efficiency of CMQV.) As usual CK stands for Canetti-Krawczyk [6] , GDH refers to the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption [19] , RO is short for the random oracle model, and KEA1 is the knowledge of exponent assumption [2] . 1 The security proof for MQV presented in [11] is in a very restricted security model.
Goals. This paper presents the two-pass CMQV protocol that achieves the following objectives: (i) intuitive design principles; (ii) efficiency of MQV and HMQV; (iii) relatively straightforward security proof with minimal assumptions in the eCK model; and (iv) a natural one-pass variant. The security proof was inspired by the HMQV argument [9] , however NAXOS' idea of hashing ephemeral private keys with static private keys is essential to show security in the eCK model. Moreover, unlike the HMQV proof, the CMQV security proof does not need the KEA1 assumption in order to demonstrate resilience to the leakage of ephemeral private keys. On the negative side, the security of CMQV is not tight. As in the case of HMQV, the reduction uses the Forking Lemma of Pointcheval and Stern [20, 21] , which results in a highly non-tight reduction.
Organization. Section 2 outlines the extended Canetti-Krawczyk security model and formalizes the security definition. The two-pass CMQV protocol is described in Section 3, and the complete security proof is provided in Section 4. Finally, the one-pass variant of CMQV with its security argument is presented in Section 5.
Notation. Let q be a prime, and let Z q denote the integers modulo q. We denote by G = G a multiplicatively-written cyclic group of order q generated by g, and by G * the set of non-identity elements in G. For group elements A, B, . . . the corresponding lowercase letters will denote the discrete logarithms in base g; for example a = log g A, where a ∈ Z q . Key agreement protocols take place between two parties, from among a set of n parties, denoted byÂ,B and so on. PartyÂ's static public key is A ∈ G and its corresponding static private key is a = log q A. In general, lower case letters represent secret information, whereas upper case letters are publicly known values. Finally, the symbol "∈ R " means "selected uniformly at random".
Extended Canetti-Krawzcyk security model
In this section we outline the eCK model; for further details the reader is referred to [12, 6] . In the eCK model there are n parties each modeled by a probabilistic Turing machine. Each party has a static public-private key pair together with a certificate that binds the public key to that party. We do not assume that the certifying authority (CA) requires parties to prove possession of their static private keys, but we insist that the CA verifies that the static public key of a party belongs to G * . For simplicity, we will only describe the model for two-pass Diffie-Hellman protocols that exchange ephemeral and static public keys -this is without loss of generality as all the protocols in Table 1 are of this kind. More precisely, two partiesÂ,B exchange static public keys A, B ∈ G * and ephemeral public keys X, Y ∈ G * ; the session key is obtained by combining A, B, X, Y and possibly the identitiesÂ,B.
Sessions. A partyÂ can be activated to execute an instance of the protocol called a session.
Activation is made via an incoming message that has one of the following forms: (i) (Â,B) or (ii) (Â,B, Y ). IfÂ was activated with (Â,B) thenÂ is the session initiator, otherwise the session responder. IfÂ is the responder of a session thenÂ prepares an ephemeral public key X and creates a separate session state where all session-specific ephemeral information is stored. The session is identified via a session identifier (R,Â,B, Y, X), where R denotes responder. IfÂ is the initiator of a session, thenÂ prepares an ephemeral public key X and creates a session state as in the responder case. At the onset of the protocol the initiator does not know the incoming ephemeral public key. However the session can be uniquely 2 identified with (I,Â,B, X, ×), where I denotes initiator, and hence this string can be used as the (temporary and incomplete) session identifier. WhenÂ receives the corresponding ephemeral public key Y , the session identifier is updated to (I,Â,B, X, Y ). A session (R,B,Â, X, Y ) (if it exists) is said to be matching to the session (I,Â,B, X, ×); it remains matching even when the identifier is updated to (I,Â,B, X, Y ). On the other hand, the session matching to (R,B,Â, X, Y ) can be any session identified by (I,Â,B, X, ×) or (I,Â,B, X, Y ). Since it is not possible (except with negligible probability) to simultaneously have two different sessions with identifiers (I,Â,B, X, ×) and (I,Â,B, X, Y ), a session (R,B,Â, X, Y ) can have at most one matching session. For a session ( * ,Â,B, * , * ), we callÂ the owner of the session, andB the peer of the session.
Adversary. The adversary M is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine and controls all communications. Parties submit outgoing messages to the adversary, who makes decisions about their delivery. The adversary presents parties with incoming messages via Send(message), thereby controlling the activation of sessions. The adversary does not have immediate access to a party's private information, however in order to capture possible leakage of private information the adversary is allowed the following queries:
• EphemeralKeyReveal(s) -The adversary obtains the ephemeral private key held by the session s.
• SessionKeyReveal(s) -The adversary obtains the session key for a session s, provided that the session holds a session key.
• StaticKeyReveal(party) -The adversary learns the static private key of the party.
• Establish(party) -This query allows the adversary to register a static public key on behalf of a party. In this way the adversary totally controls that party. Parties against whom the adversary did not issue this query are called honest.
Adversary goal. The aim of the adversary M is to distinguish a session key from a random key. Formally, the adversary is allowed to make one special query Test(s). The adversary is then given with equal probability either the session key held by s or a random key. The adversary wins the game if he guesses correctly whether the key is random or not. To define secure protocols we need the following.
Definition 2.1 (fresh session) Let s be the session identifier of a completed session, owned by an honest partyÂ with peerB, who is also honest. Let s * be the session identifier of the matching session of s, if it exists. Define s to be fresh if none of the following conditions hold:
(ii) s * exists and M makes either of the following queries:
-both StaticKeyReveal(Â) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s), or -both StaticKeyReveal(Â) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s), or -StaticKeyReveal(B).
We are now ready to present the eCK security notion.
Definition 2.2 (eCK security)
A key agreement protocol is secure if the following conditions hold:
1. If two honest parties complete matching sessions then, except with negligible probability, they both compute the same session key (or both output indication of protocol failure).
2. No polynomially bounded adversary M can distinguish the session key of a fresh session from a randomly chosen session key, with probability greater than 1/2 plus a negligible fraction.
The adversary M is allowed to continue interacting with the parties even after issuing the Test query. However, the test session must remain fresh through the experiment. As mentioned at the end of Section 1, this security definition is very strong in the sense that it simultaneously captures most of the desirable security properties for authenticated key agreement that have been identified in the literature including resistance to key-compromise impersonation attacks, weak perfect forward secrecy, and resilience to the leakage of ephemeral private keys. Unlike in the CK model [6] , the adversary in the eCK model is not equipped with a SessionStateReveal query which enables it to learn the entire session state of a particular session. This does not represent a deficiency in the eCK model since protocols such as HMQV [9] proven secure in the CK model typically specify that the ephemeral private key is the only private information stored in the session state in which case the EphemeralKeyReveal query is functionally equivalent to the SessionStateReveal query. In general, by specifying that the session specific private information (the session state) is part of the ephemeral private key, the SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal queries can be made functionally equivalent.
3 Two-pass CMQV Two-pass CMQV is a Diffie-Hellman authenticated key agreement protocol that aims to establish a secure session key between two parties; see Figure 1 for an informal description. In addition to the notation adopted at the end of Section 1, let
and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} λ be hash functions modeled as random oracles.
Protocol description
We assume for the remainder of the paper that a party never executes the protocol with itself. The two-pass CMQV protocol is formally given in the following.
Definition 3.1 (two-pass CMQV protocol) The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Upon activation (Â,B), partyÂ (the initiator) performs the steps:
(c) Initiate session s = (I,Â,B, X, * ) and send (B,Â, X) toB.
2. Upon activation (B,Â, X), partyB (the responder) performs the steps:
.
(f ) Destroy y and σ. 
(e) Destroy x and σ.
(f ) Complete session s = (I,Â,B, X, Y ) with session key κ.
If any verification fails the party erases all session specific information, which includes the ephemeral private key, from its memory and aborts the session.
It is straightforward to verify that both parties compute the same shared secret σ, and therefore also the same session key.
Design rationale
Public-key validation. Public-key validation (i.e., checking that static and ephemeral public keys belong to G * ) prevents potential invalid-curve [1] and small subgroup attacks [15] (see also [17] ). In other words, with validation a party obtains some assurance that computations involving its static private key do not reveal any information about the key itself, as long as the underlying group is cryptographically strong.
Hashing ephemeral and static private keys. A careful reader observes that in Definition 3.1 the value x = H 1 (x, a) is never stored. Whenever H 1 (x, a) is needed, it is computed. This implies that the session state does not store x. The idea is that without knowing both the ephemeral private keyx and the static private key a, no entity is able to compute the discrete logarithm x of an ephemeral public key X. This elegant idea, first described in [12] , allows the protocol to attain resistance to ephemeral private key leakage without resorting to non-trivial assumptions like KEA1 [2] (as needed for HMQV [9] ).
Rationale for exponents. Given a Computational Diffie-Hellman challenge with inputs U, V ∈ R G, knowledge of either of the discrete logarithms of U or V is enough to solve the CDH instance. If an adversary M, given a static public key B, is able to find a group element Y such that M knows the discrete logarithm of T = XB e , then it is easy to see that M can impersonateB to other parties (since M can compute the shared secret σ = (XA d ) t where t = log g T , thereby impersonatingB toÂ). Defining e to depend on Y ensures that the adversary is not able to compute the discrete logarithm of Y B e . Moreover, including the identity of the intended peer in the derivation of e prevents the adversary from potentially benefiting from the replay of Y to two distinct partiesÂ andĈ. One may argue that the inclusion of B's identity in the derivation of e is not needed since σ in any case depends onB's static public key B. However, since the CA does not require parties to prove possession of their static private keys, M may establish a new party with static public key B. HenceB is included in the derivation of e. We note that a very similar definition of e was used in HMQV [9] . For both HMQV and CMQV, this definition of the exponents is crucial for the security proof, but in both cases the reduction is non-tight. It is worth investigating if the requirements on e and d can be modified to attain a tight security reduction.
Session key derivation. The session key is κ = H(σ, X, Y,Â,B). The secrecy of σ guarantees that only the intended parties can possibly compute κ. Including identities in the key derivation is a generic way to prevent unknown-key share attacks (see [5] ). Furthermore, inclusion of X and Y in the key derivation allows for a simple argument that non-matching sessions have different session keys.
Efficiency of CMQV
The efficiency comparison in Table 1 is simplified; in particular, it does not take into account validation and various speedups that may be applicable. Consider the following groups of practical interest: (i) DSA-type groups (order-q subgroups of the multiplicative group of prime fields F p ); and (ii) elliptic curves of prime order q or nearly prime order hq. Validation for DSA-type groups requires a full exponentiation; in contrast validating points on elliptic curves of prime order is essentially free. For nearly prime order curves, rather than verifying that the order of a public key is q, parties could use the corresponding public keys multiplied by the cofactor h. Table 2 compares CMQV with HMQV as described in [10] , accounting for the validation and Shamir's speedup. The numbers in parentheses for MQV and CMQV represent the naive count of group exponentiations without accounting for possible improvements in the computations. The numbers for HMQV correspond to the two versions of HMQV as described in [10] . For HMQV, the difference is significant only in DSA-type groups as the more efficient version avoids full validation. However, the security proof in the case where validation is not required assumes that no ephemeral private keys are leaked to the adversary.
Two-pass CMQV security
This section presents a formal security argument for two-pass CMQV. The GDH assumption in G is that the CDH problem in G cannot be solved in polynomial time with non-negligible success probability even when a DDH oracle for G is available. Proof: Verifying condition 1 of Definition 2.2 is straightforward; it remains to verify condition 2. Let λ denote the security parameter, whence q = |G| = Θ(2 λ ). Let M be a polynomially (in λ) bounded CMQV adversary. The adversary M is said to be successful (event M ) with nonnegligible probability if M wins the distinguishing game described in Section 2 with probability 1 2 +p(λ), where p(λ) is non-negligible. Assume that M operates in an environment that involves at most n(λ) parties, M activates at most s(λ) sessions within a party, and makes at most h 1 (λ), h 2 (λ) and h(λ) queries to oracles H 1 ,H 2 and H, respectively; and terminates after time at most T M . Let the test session be s t = (Â,B, X, Y ) and let H denote the event that M queries H with (σ, X, Y,Â,B), where σ = CDH(XA d , Y B e ). Let H be the complement of H and s * be any other completed session owned by an honest party, such that s t and s * are non-matching. Since s t and s * are non-matching, the input to the key derivation function H are different for s t and s * . And since H is a random oracle it follows that M cannot obtain any information about the test session key from the session key of non-matching sessions. Hence Pr(M ∧ H) ≤ 
Following the standard approach such an adversary M is used to construct a GDH solver S that succeeds with non-negligible probability. Let ξ : G × G → G be a random function known only to S, such that ξ(X, Y ) = ξ(Y, X). The algorithm S will use ξ to simulate CDH(X, Y ) when S may not know log g (X) or log g (Y ). Let the input to the GDH challenge be (U, V ) and consider the following complementary events:
DL. There exists an honest partyB such that M, during its execution, queries If M succeeds with non-negligible probability, and hence Pr(M * ) ≥ p, it must be the case that either event DL ∧ M * or event DL ∧ M * occurs with non-negligible probability. These events are considered separately.
Event DL
Simulation. Suppose that event DL ∧ M * occurs with non-negligible probability. In this case S prepares n parties. One party, calledV , is selected at random and assigned static public key V ; S representsV 's static private key by ν ∈ R Z q . The remaining n − 1 parties are assigned random static key pairs. The adversary M is initiated on this set of parties and the simulation of M's environment proceeds as follows:
1. Send(Â,B): S executes Step 1 of the protocol. 4. EphemeralKeyReveal(s): S responds to the query faithfully.
5. SessionKeyReveal(s): S responds to the query faithfully.
6. StaticKeyReveal(Â): S responds to the query faithfully, unlessÂ =V in which case S aborts with failure.
7. Establish(M ): S responds to the query faithfully. 
ii. If τ = 0, then S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
(b) S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
11. Test(s): S responds to the query faithfully.
12. M outputs a guess: S aborts with failure.
Analysis of event DL ∧ M * . S's simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. With probability at least 1 n , S assigns the public key V to an honest partyB for whom M will query H 1 ( * , b) without first issuing a StaticKeyReveal(B) query. In this case S is successful as described in Step 8 and the abortions in Steps 6 and 12 do not occur. Hence if event DL∧M * occurs with probability p DL , then S is successful with probability Pr(S) that is bounded by
Let T M be the event "the test session has a matching session owned by an honest party". Event DL ∧ M * is further subdivided into the following complementary events:
, and
Let pD L = Pr(DL∧M * ), p m = Pr(T m ), and pm = Pr(T m ). Since T m and T m are complementary pD L = p m + pm. Therefore, if event DL ∧ M * occurs with non-negligible probability, then either T m or T m occurs with non-negligible probability. Events T m and T m are next considered separately.
Event T m
Simulation. Suppose that event T m occurs with non-negligible probability. In this case S establishes n honest parties that are assigned random static key pairs, and randomly selects two integers i, j ∈ R [1, . . . , ns]. The i'th and the j'th sessions created will be called s U and s V , respectively. The ephemeral private key of s U is denoted byũ and the ephemeral private keys of s V is denoted byṽ. The simulation of M's environment proceeds as follows:
1. Send(Â,B): S executes Step 1 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is s U or s V , then S deviates by setting the ephemeral public key X to be U or V , respectively, thereby defining H 1 (ũ, a) = log g U or H 1 (ṽ, a) = log g V . Note that in this case S cannot respond to either H 1 (ũ, a) = log g U or H 1 (ṽ, a) = log g V .
Send(B,Â, X): S executes
Step 2 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is s U or s V , then S deviates by setting the ephemeral public key Y to be U or V , respectively, and setting σ = ξ(XA d , Y B e ).
Send(Â,B, X, Y ): S executes
Step 3 of the protocol. However, if X ∈ {U, V } then S deviates by setting σ = ξ(XA d , Y B e ).
EphemeralKeyReveal(s):
S responds to the query faithfully.
SessionKeyReveal(s):
6. StaticKeyReveal(Â): S responds to the query faithfully.
7. Establish(M ): S responds to the query faithfully.
8. H 1 (x, a): S simulates a random oracle in the usual way except ifÂ owns s U and x =ũ or ifÂ owns s V and x =ṽ, in which case S aborts with failure. 
(d) S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
Test(s t ):
If s U and s V are non-matching or if s t is neither s U nor s V , then S aborts; otherwise responds to the query faithfully.
Analysis of event T m ∧ DL ∧ M * . S's simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. The probability that M selects s U and s V as the test session and its matching is at least 2 (ns) 2 . Suppose that this is the case, so S does not abort as in Step 11 , and suppose that event T m occurs. Without loss of generality, let s t = s U = (Â,B, U, V ). Sincẽ u is used only in the test session, M must obtain it via an EphemeralKeyReveal query before making an H 1 query that includesũ. Similarly, M must obtainṽ from the matching session via an EphemeralKeyReveal query before making an H 1 query that includesṽ. Under event DL, the adversary first issues a StaticKeyReveal query to a party before making an H 1 query that includes that party's static private key. Since the test session is fresh, M can query for at most one value in each of the pairs (ũ, a) and (ṽ, b); hence S does not abort as described in Step 8. Under event M * , except with negligible probability of guessing ξ(U A d , V B e ), S is successful as described in Step 10a and does not abort as in Step 12. Therefore if event T m occurs, then the success probability of S is bounded by
Event T m
Simulation. Suppose that event T m occurs with non-negligible probability. Recall that event T m implies that no honest party owns a session matching to the test session. In this case S prepares n parties. One party, calledV , is selected at random and assigned static public key V and S representsV 's static private key by ν ∈ R Z q . The remaining n − 1 parties are assigned random static key pairs. Furthermore, S randomly selects an integer i ∈ R [1, . . . , ns]. The i'th session created will be called s U and s U 's ephemeral private key will be denoted byũ. The simulation of M's environment proceeds as follows:
1. Send(Â,B): S executes Step 1 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is s U , then S deviates by setting the ephemeral public key X to be U .
Send(B,Â, X): S executes
Step 2 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is s U , S deviates by setting the ephemeral public key Y to be U . In addition ifB =V or
3. Send(Â,B, X, Y ): S executes Step 3 of the protocol. However, ifÂ =V or X = U , then S deviates by setting σ = ξ(XA d , Y B e ).
4. EphemeralKeyReveal(s): S responds to the query faithfully.
8. H 1 (x, a): S simulates a random oracle in the usual way except ifÂ owns s U and x =ũ, in which case S aborts with failure.
9. H 2 ( * ): S simulates a random oracle in the usual way. 
H(σ, X, Y,Â,B):
11. Test(s t ): If s t = s U or the peer of s t is notV , then S aborts with failure; otherwise responds to the query faithfully.
Analysis of event T m ∧ DL ∧ M * . The simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. The probability that the test session has peerV and outgoing ephemeral public key U is at least 1 n 2 s
. Suppose that this is indeed the case, so S does not abort as in Step 11 , and suppose that event T m occurs. Sinceũ is used only in the test session, M must obtain it via an EphemeralKeyReveal query before making an H 1 query that includesũ. Under event DL, the adversary first issues a StaticKeyReveal query to a party before making an H 1 query that includes that party's static private key. Since the test session is fresh, and s t has no matching session a successful M does not query for x; hence S does not abort as described in Steps 6 and 8. The forking is at the expense of introducing a wider gap in the reduction. The success probability of S, excluding negligible terms, is
where C is a constant arising from the use of the Forking Lemma 3
Analysis
Suppose that event M occurs. Combining Equations (1), (2) and (3), the success probability of S is
which is non-negligible in λ.
The simulation requires S to perform group exponentiations, access the DDH oracle, and simulate random oracles. Since q = Θ(2 λ ), a group exponentiation takes time T G = O(λ) group multiplications. Assume that a DDH oracle call takes time T DDH = O(λ). Responding to an H query takes time T H = O(λ); similarly, responding to H 1 and H 2 queries takes time T H 1 (λ) and T H 2 (λ). Taking the largest times from among all simulations for answering M's queries, the running time of S is bounded by
Thus, if M is polynomially bounded, then there is an algorithm S that succeeds in solving the GDH problem in G with non-negligible probability. Furthermore S runs in polynomial time, contradicting the GDH assumption in G. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
One-pass CMQV
One-pass protocols are useful in environments, where the responder is not available for immediate reply; hence there are fundamental differences with interactive environments. There are important scenarios, such as email, where one-pass protocols are useful and therefore they are worth studying.
Description
In a nutshell, one-pass CMQV is two-pass CMQV, where the ephemeral public key Y of the responder is the identity element in the group. To that end there is no need to include Y in the key derivation. If any verification fails, then the party erases all session specific information from its memory and aborts the session.
One-pass model modifications
Even though the definition of secure protocol (Definition 2.2) does not depend on the number of protocol flows, the definition of fresh session has to be modified to fit the needs of a one-pass protocol. In particular, one-pass protocols cannot achieve forward secrecy since an adversary can compute a session key by learning the static private key of the responder.
Definition 5.2 (one-pass fresh session) Let s be the session identifier of a completed session, owned by an honest partyÂ with intended peerB, who is also honest. Let s * be the session identifier of the matching session of s, if it exists. Define s to be fresh if none of the following conditions hold:
(ii) ifÂ is the initiator then M makes either of the following queries:
-both StaticKeyReveal(Â) and EphemeralKeyReveal(s), or (iii) ifÂ is the responder then M makes either of the following queries
We point out that by replaying messages fromÂ toB an adversary M could force multiple sessions owned byB sharing the same session key κ. Let S κ be the set of sessions owned bŷ B with the same session key κ. Since all sessions in S κ have the same session identifiers, M cannot compromise a single session in S κ without compromising all sessions in S κ . Therefore, the definition of session identifier accounts for replay attacks.
6 One-pass CMQV security
The security argument for one-pass CMQV is very similar to the security argument for two-pass CMQV Section 4. Theorem 6.1 If H 1 ,H 2 and H are random oracles, and G is a group where the GDH assumption holds, then one-pass CMQV is eCK secure.
Proof: Verifying condition 1 of Definition 2.2 is straightforward; it remains to verify condition 2.
Let λ denote the security parameter, whence q = |G| = Θ(2 λ ). Let M be a polynomially (in λ) bounded one-pass CMQV adversary. The adversary M is said to be successful (event M ) with non-negligible probability if M wins the distinguishing game described in Section 2 with probability 1 2 + p(λ), where p(λ) is non-negligible. Assume that M operates in an environment that involves at most n(λ) parties, and within a party M activates at most s(λ) sessions as the initiator within a party, and makes at most h 1 (λ), h 2 (λ) and h(λ) queries to oracles H 1 ,H 2 and H, respectively; and terminates after time at most T M . Let the test session be s t = (Â,B, X) and let H denote the event that M queries H with (σ, X,Â,B), where σ = CDH (XA d , B) . Let H be the complement of H and s * be any completed session owned by an honest party, such that s t and s * are non-matching. Since s t and s * are non-matching, the input to the key derivation function H are different for s t and s * . And since H is a random oracle it follows that M cannot obtain any information about the test session key from the session key of non-matching sessions. Hence Pr(M ∧ H) ≤ 
Following the standard approach, such an adversary M is used to construct a GDH solver S that succeeds with non-negligible probability. Let ξ : G × G → G be a random function known only to S, such that ξ(X, Y ) = ξ(Y, X). The algorithm S will use ξ to simulate CDH(X, Y ) when S may not know log g (X) or log g (Y ). Let the input to the GDH challenge be (U, V ) and consider the following complementary events:
Event DL
1 n , S assigns the public key V to an honest partyB for whom M will query H 1 ( * , b) without first issuing a StaticKeyReveal(B) query. In this case S is successful as described in Step 7 and the abortions as in Steps 5 and 11 do not occur. Hence if event DL∧M * occurs with probability p DL , then S is successful with probability Pr(S) that is bounded by
Let T m be the event "the test session has a matching session owned by an honest party or the test session owner is also the session initiator". Event DL ∧ M * is further subdivided into the following complementary events:
Let pD L = Pr(DL∧M * ), p m = Pr(T m ), and pm = Pr(T m ). Since T m and T m are complementary, pD L = p m + pm. Therefore, if event DL ∧ M * occurs with non-negligible probability, then either T m or T m occurs with non-negligible probability. Events T m and T m are next considered separately.
Event T m
Simulation in event T m . Suppose that event T m occurs with non-negligible probability. In this case S establishes n parties. One party, calledV , is selected at random and assigned static public key V ; S representsV 's static private key by ν ∈ R Z q . The remaining n − 1 parties are assigned random static key pairs. Furthermore, S randomly selects an integer i ∈ R [1, . . . , ns].
The i'th session created will be called s U and s U 's ephemeral private key will be denoted byũ. The simulation of M's environment proceeds as follows:
(c) S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
10. Test(s t ): If the peer of s U is notV or if s t is neither s U nor the session matching to s U , then S aborts; otherwise responds to the query faithfully.
11. M outputs a guess: S aborts with failure.
Analysis of event T m ∧ DL ∧ M * . S's simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. The probability that M selectsV as s U 's peer and s t is either s U or its matching session is at least 2 ns 2 . Suppose that this is the case, so S does not abort as in Step 10, and suppose that event T m occurs. Without loss of generality, let s U = (Â,V , U ). Sinceũ is used only in s U , M must obtainũ via an EphemeralKeyReveal query before making an H 1 query that includesũ. Under event DL, the adversary first issues a StaticKeyReveal(Â) query before making an H 1 query that includes x. Since the test session is fresh, S does not abort as described in Step 5 and 7. Under event M * , except with negligible probability of guessing ξ(U A d , V ), S is successful as described in Step 9a and does not abort as in Step 11. Therefore if event T m occurs, then the success probability of S is
Simulation. Suppose that event T m occurs with non-negligible probability, in which case no honest party owns a session matching to the test session and the test session owner is also the responder. In this case S prepares n parties. Two of these parties, denoted byÛ andV , are selected uniformly at random and assigned static public keys U and V , respectively. The remaining n − 2 parties are assigned random static key pairs. The algorithm S will use υ ∈ R Z q and ν ∈ R Z q , to represent the static private keys ofÛ andV , respectively. The simulation of M's environment proceeds as follows:
and eitherÛ ∈ {Â,B} orV ∈ {Â,B}, then
ii. if DDH(XA d , B) = 0, then S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
10. Test(s t ): If the communicating partners of s t are notÛ andV , then S aborts with failure; otherwise responds to the query faithfully.
Analysis of event T m ∧ DL ∧ M * . The simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. The probability thatÛ andV are the test session's communicating partners is at least 2 n 2 . Suppose that this is indeed the case, so S does not abort as in Step 10, and suppose that event T m occurs. Since the test session is fresh, and s t has no matching session, then S does not abort as described in Step 5.
Without loss of generality, let s t = (Û ,V , B), where B denotes s t 's incoming ephemeral public key selected by M. Under event M * , except with negligible probability of guessing The forking is at the expense of introducing a wider gap in the reduction. The success probability of S, excluding negligible terms, is
where C is a constant arising from the Forking Lemma.
Analysis
Suppose that event M occurs. Combining Equations (6), (7) and (8), the success probability of S is Pr(S) ≥ max 1 n(λ) p DL (λ), 2 n(λ)s(λ) 2 p m (λ),
The simulation requires S to perform group exponentiations, access the DDH oracle, and simulate random oracles. Since q = Θ(2 λ ), a group exponentiation takes time T G = O(λ) group multiplications. Assume that a DDH oracle call takes time T DDH = O(λ). Responding to an H query takes time T H = O(λ); similarly responding to H 1 and H 2 queries takes time T H 1 (λ) and T H 2 (λ), respectively. Taking the largest times from among all simulations for answering M's query, the running time of S is bounded by
Thus, if M is polynomially bounded, then there is an algorithm S that succeeds in solving the GDH problem in G with non-negligible probability. Furthermore S runs in polynomial time, contradicting the GDH assumption in G. This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Comments

Model description
As described in [12] the adversary is not given an Establish query. Instead the adversary selects the identifiers for the parties and is allowed to register adversary controlled parties at the onset of the protocol, more precisely during the registration phase. The Establish query used here achieves the same if the first queries performed by the adversary are all Establish queries. Furthermore, it allows the adversary to adaptively select public keys and identities based on the ephemeral public keys selected by the honest parties. As such the query allows modeling of Kaliski [8] type unknown key share attacks.
Simulation
We stress that the eCK model allows for sessions where the initiator and the responder are the same party. As pointed out in Section 3.1 the security arguments have been carried out under the assumption that a party does not execute the protocol with itself. That assumption is needed in simulation Step 10(a)i of Section 4.2.2 and simulation Step 9a of Section 6.2.1, where it is assumed that S possesses the value a. If the owner and the peer of the test session is the same partyV , then algorithm S does not posses the value a and cannot perform the required computations. Furthermore, simulation
Step 10 of Section 6.2.2 requires distinct test session partners. These shortcoming can be addressed by introducing additional events and utilizing the "gap square Diffie-Hellman assumption". For sake of simplicity this has not been done.
Concluding remarks
The paper presented CMQV, a modification of the MQV key agreement protocol. On the positive side the new protocol is secure in the extended Canetti-Krawzcyk model. Moreover it achieves the performance of the original MQV protocol, and has intuitive design principles and a relatively simple security proof. On the negative side the reduction argument is not tight, in particular the Forking Lemma appears to be essential for the security argument. It remains to be seen if there exists a protocol that achieves the performance of MQV and at the same time enjoys a security reduction that is as tight as the security reduction for NAXOS.
